Wave Two Chinese rare earth export controls expire November 10, 2026. Their activation will force a structural reconfiguration of global non-Chinese supply chains — creating acute sourcing risk, requiring contract renegotiations, triggering supplier qualification processes that take 18-24 months, and demanding corporate strategic decisions about product architecture, investment priorities, and programme participation that most organisations have not yet made.
MPC advises management teams, boards, and investors navigating these consequences. We work across the full response spectrum — from understanding exposure at the component level, to assessing non-Chinese supply alternatives, to setting up and managing the funded programme structures that underwrite long-term supply chain resilience.
Michael Prassas has held commercial responsibility on every side of the rare earth value chain: at Solvay Rare Earth Systems negotiating nine-figure supply agreements with global OEMs, at Peak Resources as GM Sales for the world’s highest-grade NdPr deposit, at Primobius as Commercial Manager for the Mercedes-Benz battery recycling JV, and at policy level through active relationships at ERMA, EIT RawMaterials, and DG GROW.
That combination — supplier, developer, OEM recycling, EU institutions — is what makes the Wave Two consequence analysis credible. The regulatory framing, the upstream supply economics, the OEM qualification requirements, and the programme access landscape are all understood from the inside. EUR 600K in EU Horizon funding secured. Nobody operating independently has this combination.
To support management teams, boards, and stakeholders in making informed, resilient decisions across critical raw-materials supply chains — with particular focus on the Wave Two rare earth export control environment and what it means for supply chain architecture through 2026 and beyond.
MPC exists to bridge industry, policy, capital, and downstream demand — helping organisations navigate complexity with discipline, discretion, and practical execution.
“The scale of what Wave Two represents is still not fully understood outside the specialist community. China controls approximately 85-90% of global rare earth refining. The controls do not just create a price premium — they threaten the availability of the materials that make electric motors, wind turbines, and defence systems work. The US response has been to pour capital at the problem, with the result that dozens of companies are now calling themselves rare earth or NdFeB producers. Very few of them will ever deliver at OEM specification, at OEM volume, or on OEM timelines. The critical skill is not finding companies — it is knowing which ones are real. That requires understanding the full value chain from the mine to the magnet to the motor, running structured selection processes, conducting site visits, and assessing whether a potential partner can genuinely meet the qualification requirements of a Tier 1 or OEM. That is where thirty years of sitting on every side of this market becomes the difference between a supply chain that works and one that fails under pressure.”
“The information landscape around non-Chinese rare earth supply is fragmented, inconsistent, and in many cases deliberately opaque. Companies present their capabilities at the level of aspiration rather than demonstrated reality. Making sense of that — across multiple jurisdictions, technology readiness levels, and commercial structures — requires systematic research discipline. My role is to ensure that when Michael sits down with a client or walks into a site visit, every relevant piece of intelligence has already been gathered, assessed, and structured into something that informs a decision rather than adds to the noise.”